I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1992, WHILE I was living once again in the suburbios (low-income settlements) in Guayaquil, Ecuador, local community members explained to me how serious a problem local violence had become in their daily lives. Violent robbery on buses was so ubiquitous that, over a six-month period, one in five women had been attacked by young men armed with knives, machetes or hand guns. The streets were no longer safe after dark, so girls and young women were dropping out of night school, exacerbating their social isolation. The cost of upgrading housing had expanded to include security grilles on windows, and doors designed to deter burglars.
Certainly, there had always been known ladrones (robbers). These had been pointed out to me when I first lived there in 1978 -mainly young men, often also marijaneros (marijuana smokers). But in those days, they never burgled in their own neighbourhood. Although houses with their split cane walls were vulnerable to break-ins, local community social capital was strong enough to hound out wellknown criminals if they got too close for comfort. Of course, there was always violence inside the household, particularly men beating up their wives and partners, especially when they were drunk. But this was accompanied by silent fear that prevented women from addressing the problem either individually or collectively.
Over the 15-year period, however, the nature of the violence had changed considerably. So 1992 was my real introduction to urban violence as a development constraint that eroded the assets of the poor and affected their livelihoods and well-being.
(1) Like many others writing in this volume, my background is not in criminology, social work or psychology -three of the disciplines traditionally most associated with violence as an issue of individual criminal pathology. Rather, I am an urban anthropologist. In the past decade, as lethal violence and its associated fear and insecurity have been recognized increasingly as a critical problem in urban areas, so the range of researchers, policy makers and practitioners focusing on this issue has expanded. Today, economists, political scientists, transport planners, architects and NGO community workers, among others, all grapple with the ubiquitous presence of urban violence in their work in cities.
Despite the growing attention to urban violence, we are faced with an important contradiction. On the one hand, we are still on a slow learning curve. This is reflected in the fact that this is the first volume of Environment and Urbanization devoted solely to this issue -although there have been notable self-standing articles in earlier issues. (2) On the other hand, as we seek to comprehend the complex, multi-layered nature of violence, the phenomenon itself is not static. Along with newer preoccupations, such as globalization, post 9/11 fears and insecurities, international migration and "failing" states, not to mention long-term difficulties of exclusion, poverty and inequality, the face of urban violence itself is also rapidly, dramatically changing.
This issue of Environment and Urbanization seeks to understand better the phenomenon of urban violence and insecurity, to document the causes, costs and consequences, and to highlight community-based innovative solutions to the problem. This introduction, therefore, has the challenge of simultaneously reconciling these two aspects -it needs to provide a basic roadmap of urban violence as a background to the papers in this volumewhile also highlighting some of the concerns raised in the articles themselves. These include new insights into long-known violence-related problems, as well as newer "cutting-edge" issues.
II. HOW DO WE ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF URBAN VIOLENCE AND INSECURITY?
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK for understanding urban violence, developed cumulatively with colleagues over the past decade, (3) presents a useful starting point for a "skeleton" background roadmap within which to highlight the particular significance of newly emerging issues in the field of urban violence. This provides a structure for the paper, which addresses the following four interrelated objectives:
• to define and systematically categorize the multiple forms of violence; • to profile the measurement, trends and characteristics of urban violence; • to identify interrelated causes, costs and consequences of the phenomenon; and • to understand the different types of interventions to reduce violence at national, city and community level, focusing on the urban poor and excluded. Most generic definitions present violence as the use of physical force, which causes hurt to others in order to impose one's wishes. (5) Broader definitions, however, extend beyond physical violence to refer to psychological hurt, material deprivation and symbolic disadvantage. (6) Most definitions recognize that violence involves the exercise of power that is invariably used to legitimize the use of force for specific gains. (7) Definitions of violence often overlap with those of conflict and crime, reflected in terms such as "violent crime", "criminal conflict", "conflictual violence" and "violent conflict". However, there are important distinctions between them. (8) While violence and conflict are both concerned with power, conflict-based power struggles do not necessarily inflict physical or mental harm on others, while violence by its very nature does. Conflict, therefore, can be peacefully resolved through negotiation without recourse to force, but becomes violent/armed conflict when it includes fighting and killing. Crime is an act (usually a grave offence) punishable by law, i.e. the breach of a legal prohibition, and violent crime, in turn, has been defined as any act that causes a physical or psychological wound or damage and which is against the law. The uncertainty generated by violence is expressed in fear and insecurity. Fear has been defined as "…the institutional, cultural and psychological repercussion of violence", (10) and identified as an outcome of destabilization, exclusion and uncertainty. (11) Although perceptions of insecurity cannot be reflected in statistical evidence, they fundamentally affect well-being.
III. DEFINITIONS AND
(12) At the same time, the "livelihood security" of the poor and their ability to access resources to ensure survival are closely linked, in an interconnected vicious cycle, to violence. This relates not only to the spatial, economic and social constraints that the complex layering of endemic violence imposes on their daily lives, but also to the fact that, as citizens, their insecurity is closely linked to the failure of the state's public security systems to protect them. (13) b. What are the main categories of urban violence?
Although the different types of violence are overlapping and cross-cutting, calling for holistic understanding, policy makers and practitioners need to categorize the phenomenon if they are to design interventions to prevent or reduce it. The conceptual framework makes a four-fold distinction between political, institutional, economic and social violence -with each category identified in terms of the motivation for the physical act that consciously or unconsciously is used to gain or maintain power.
As highlighted in Mo Hume's article on El Salvador, much social violence is gender-basedthat is, linked to gendered power relations and constructions of masculinities. (14) Gender-based violence includes intimate-partner violence and child abuse inside the home, as described in the paper by Robyn Eversole, Richard Routh and Leon Ridgeway on an Indigenous population in a small Australian town, as well as sexual abuse in the public arena.
(15) Social violence also includes ethnic violence, (16) or territorial or identity-based violence linked with gangs, such as that described in Ailsa Winton's paper on urban Guatemala. conflict or political assassination. Although it is closely linked to conflict and war, political violence is also committed during peacetime.
Since any categorization is, by definition, too static to represent a dynamic and holistic phenomenon, the four-fold typology identified above is conceived as an interrelated continuum with close linkages between different types of violence. These interrelationships are most dramatically illustrated in the paper on Medellín, Colombia, by Francisco Gutiérrez and Ana María Jaramillo, who outline the "reconfiguration of the city's security map" by means of a continuum that ranges historically from gangs and hit killers (sicarios), through left-wing militia to right-wing paramilitary.
Finally, it is also important to include the concept of "structural violence". This concept draws attention to the fact that violence may not always be just a physical act, but also a process that can be embedded into wider social structures. Galtung extended the notion of violence beyond situations of overt brutality to include more implicit forms such as exploitation, exclusion, inequality and injustice. From this perspective, "…violence [can be] built into the structure [of society,] ...show [ing] up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances" rather than solely as "direct" forms of violence. (18) In this volume, for instance, Eversole and colleagues raise the issue of structural violence as a causal factor influencing Indigenous violence (see below). Table 1 provides a summary roadmap of a few of the extensive, complex manifestations of urban violence within these four categories -many of which are the focus of different articles in this issue. Despite the fact that there is no uniform checklist as to what constitutes violence, (19) as a roadmap, Table 1 is intended to provide some examples. As an analytical tool, it may also provide a useful starting point for categorizing the types of violence in a specific city.
IV. A PROFILE OF THE TRENDS AND MEASUREMENT OF URBAN VIOLENCE
ALTHOUGH ACCELERATING RATES of violence and crime are by no means an urbanspecific problem, they are particularly problematic in urban areas. The sheer scale of violence in the poor areas or slums means that, in many contexts, it has become "routinized" or "normalized" into the functional reality of daily life. (20) The range of types of urban violence and crime is both complex and context-specific. In an urban Jamaican community, for instance, local residents in a participatory assessment listed 19 types of violence, including political, gang, economic, interpersonal and domestic disputes; the average number identified in nine Guatemalan poor urban communities was 41, while in Colombia the comparable average was 25. (21) Despite the high prevalence of rural violence in the past, within countries, violence is usually most severe in large urban areas. City-level differences in homicide levels can be striking. In Latin America, for instance, rates range from 6.4 per year per 100,000 in Buenos Aires to 248 in Medellín. (22) Cities such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Mexico City, Lima and Caracas account for more than half the total of their national homicides. (23) Turning to intra-country city differences, city growth rate is a stronger indicator of crime rates than city size. It cannot be assumed that violence is manifested and experienced in the same way in different cities, even within the same national context. Again, Latin American data is illustrative. For instance, between 1979 and 1998 in Brazil, the homicide rate in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro rose by a relatively modest 35 per cent, while that in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo increased by 103 per cent.
(24) Differences in rural-urban violence levels are less marked in post-conflict countries, where rural violence is often still more extreme than in urban areas. In El Salvador, 76 per cent of homicides occur in rural areas as against only 24 per cent in urban areas. (25) Within cities, disparities in levels of violence are based on neighbourhood income levels. More prosperous areas suffer from violent crime, usually property-related, such as vehicle robbery, (26) while severe violence is generally concentrated in lower-income areas. With the poor often located both in the inner city and in the marginal periphery, it is in the latter that prevalence rates are particularly high. (27) However, increases in vehicle robbery -much of it associated with the growing risk of being killed in the process (as against vehicle theft, where personal intimidation is not a factor) -have heightened insecurity among the "target" wealthier population. (28) Finally, levels of violence also show important variations based on age and gender, with young men most likely to be both the victims and the perpetrators. A seven-cities Latin American study showed higher male than female rates of violence. (29) In Brazil, the estimated homicide rate in 1999 among men aged between 15 and 24 was 86.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to a rate of only 6.5 for women of the same age; (30) while in Puerto Rico, the comparable rates for men and women aged between 15 and 29 were 101 and 6.8, respectively.
(31) Thus, even in countries with relatively low levels of violence, not only is male juvenile violence rising, but its intensity is also increasing. (32) a. Can we measure violence?
The measurement of violence is limited by a number of important constraints. The most common concerns the use of mortality statistics as proxies for levels of violence. Such statistics are notoriously unreliable due to under-reporting, difficulties in interpretation and lack of reliability of data. (33) This is particularly true of the most commonly used indicator of violent crime, the homicide rate. Not only does the homicide rate disregard non-fatal violence (and within this, nonphysical violence), but it also generally includes both intentional and unintentional violent deaths. For instance, it often includes car accidents. In addition, national and regional differences in data collection methods, recall periods and cultural definitions of crime and violence make valid crosscountry comparisons very hard to achieve. (34) Given the tremendous constraints on accurate measurements of urban violence, as highlighted by many papers in this volume, this is a particular challenge now facing many urban researchers. Charlotte Lemanski, for instance, raises one important methodological issue in the measurement of fear. In her paper on Cape Town, South Africa, she states that the emotional nature of fear of crime renders measurement problematic; asking questions about fear increases anxiety among respondents, with specific groups, such as men, tending to under-acknowledge fear.
A useful contribution to the issue of measurement is also provided by James Garrett and Akhter Ahmed in their paper describing the methodology for incorporating a module on crime and violence into a household survey in a medium-sized city in Bangladesh. They argue that this can be a small investment with large returns, which not only provides more accurate data than police statistics but also identifies the ways in which crime can undermine livelihoods -thereby closely linking with general survey objectives.
A growing recognition that quantitative methodologies fail to capture how people actually experience the multiple forms of violence on a daily basis has resulted in increased use of complementary qualitative sociological and anthropological methodologies. Building on earlier participatory urban violence appraisals, (35) in this volume Winton, and McIlwaine and Moser, use such participatory appraisal techniques to give voice to people's perceptions of violence. In addition, Paula Meth describes the innovative use of solicited personal diaries, triangulated with focus group discussions, as a method for understanding women's responses to crime and violence in a South African settlement. She highlights the advantages of diary-writing as an empowering experience for many women ("…it was like a big luggage has been removed from my shoulders") while also pointing to drawbacks relating to skill and selectivity. 
V. IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTERRELATED CAUSES, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
of the best-known approaches for grappling with the interrelated nature of violence being the "ecological model". (37) This seeks to demonstrate that no single cause determines or explains violence and, instead, maps the way in which factors at different levels (individual, interpersonal, institutional and structural) combine to contribute to violence. (38) A different holistic framework, developed by Moser and McIlwaine (39) in their research on community perceptions of urban violence, builds on sociological debates (40) to locate the situationspecific nature of people's experience of violence within a broader structural context. It identifies factors underlying violence, fear and insecurity in terms of the three interrelated concepts of structure, identity and agency. Since issues of power and powerlessness are fundamental to understanding the causal factors that underpin violence, this allows for the analysis of the wider political and socioeconomic power structure within which individual realities are manifest. This framework also recognizes that experiences of violence depend on such elements of individual identity formation as gender, age, ethnicity and race. Finally, identity is closely interrelated with individual "human agency", a concept which recognizes individuals as social actors who face alternative ways of formulating their objectives, however restricted their resources. A number of the papers in this issue reference the relationship between structure, identity and agency as underlying causal factors of violence. In writing about Indigenous crime in a small Australian town, Eversole and colleagues highlight the importance of structural constraints -in this case the "structural violence" associated with the state's "forced removals" policy, as well as persistent institutionalized racism towards Indigenous Australians -as factors contributing to increasing the risk of Indigenous Australians being involved in crime. At the same time, they demonstrate that their identity as members of a marginalized Indigenous community provides them with considerable internal social support to confront the problem of crime in a holistic manner.
Another example that links violence to the construction of social identity in an excluded group is provided by youth gangs, whose increasing presence in Central America has resulted in punitive state action aimed at their repression. This is discussed both by Winton in Guatemala and by Hume in El Salvador. Hume also focuses on how the social construction of masculine identity is linked with the exercise of male power over women, and manifested in sexual violence against them. In turn, male agency is minimized socially, with women seen as being responsible for protecting themselves against male behaviour.
In urban contexts, a particularly important debate concerns the extent to which crime and violence are causally rooted in poverty or inequality. While poverty has long been considered the predominant determinant of violence, more recently this linear relationship has been challenged as too simplistic. Interpretations based on statistical modelling, for instance, have demonstrated that, with regard to national-level data on murder rates, inequality is more influential than poverty, with income inequalities being generally more marked in urban than in rural areas. (42) Some analysts argue that increased levels of violence are also closely tied to the interrelated processes of globalization and structural adjustment, as well as political democratization. At the same time, the daily living conditions of the urban poor heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime or violence.
(43) In reality, poverty and inequality frequently overlap to generate conditions in which some people resort to crime and violence.
The linkages between exclusion, inequality and identity are identified as important causal factors explaining high levels of inter-communal violence in urban Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In her paper, Zeina Halabi provides a detailed description of the historical roots of discrimination, originating with the camps' establishment by UNWRA more than 50 years ago and reinforced through the Lebanese civil war and postwar context. A case study of one of the camps, Chatila, illustrates the conflict over identity, which is linked both to refugee status and to political alliance -since the exclusion of Palestinians from the Lebanese political and economic system has exacerbated employment inequalities. In the camps, conflicts over "morality" have occurred, with the young rental population of "outsider" Syrian men being accused of sexually assaulting "insider" Palestinian women.
However, in explaining the continuous presence of armed political groupings in Medellín, Colombia, over the past 20 years, Gutiérrez and Jaramillo present an alternative perspective. They argue that extreme inequality does not appear to be a factor that separates this city from others or from the rest of the country. Nor, as is often cited, is the "absence of the state" a cause, "…with the state and modern capitalism highly visible" in Medellín. While social exclusion is a strong indirect catalyst of urban violence, it is the conjuncture of the politicization of crime (with increasingly tight links between political violence and criminal (economic) violence) and the privatization of security that is the predominant causal factor. Despite repeated attempts by municipal and national government authorities to broker peace accords, the authors conclude that, "…with all their positive aspects, the peace accords have only reshuffled the security personnel that proliferate in the city."
This new theme of the "politicization of crime" as a causal factor that underpins city violence is also a growing concern in contexts where a "crisis of governance" means that state institutions are challenged or superseded by non-state forms of social governance. A complex example provided by Daniel Esser's paper discusses the implications of the "urbanization of warfare" for cities in regional conflict zones. Using the examples of Kabul and Karachi, he argues that these host and perpetuate social and political systems and structures that induce violent behaviour. Insurgency forces often concentrate their efforts in urban arenas, as the centres of political and economic power. Not only is the city a high-impact target, but defenders also have an interest in drawing the conflict into densely populated areas, in order to negate opponents' military advantages. In addition, the changing nature of warfare benefits those most involved in organized crime -with "openwar economies" serving to integrate the urban with global criminal economies. All of this has important implications for effective governance in regional conflict zones that have recently emerged from full-blown war. In direct contrast to this is the case of Cape Town, where Lemanski argues that it is the proliferation of private security measures that has undermined state efforts to develop adequate policing solutions.
b. Can we count the costs and consequences of urban violence?
Closely related to the causal factors underlying violence are the costs and consequences of violent action. Economic monetary cost data can provide a common, interpretable metric for understanding the impact of crime on both individuals and society. This allows for a comparison with the costs of other social ills, and provides a useful comparative tool to highlight the importance of violence-reduction strategies. As Macmillan (44) suggests, more often than not this highlights the relative importance of the costs of violence, with important policy implications in terms of costbenefit assessments of different policy options.
Most research on the costs of violence is based on the categorization of direct and indirect costs of violence. (45) Probably the greatest advances have been made with measurements of direct economic costs, such as the associated losses as a result of death or disability, and "transferrals" resulting from property crimes, calculated as percentages of GNP or GDP. However, constraints include not only methodological issues but also, in many contexts, lack of access to information on violencerelated expenditure assessments of the police, the judiciary, the penal system and even the armed forces. However, many of the components of indirect costs, for both individual victims and society as a whole, are intangible and, in this case, no reliable quantitative data exist.
At the same time, violence has a dramatic impact on people's well-being in terms of their livelihood security and the functioning of local social institutions. A framework that identifies the linkages between violence and the capital assets and capabilities associated with livelihood security can assist in identifying the costs of violence at the local level. From the extensive "livelihood" debate, a consensus has emerged with regard to the identification of five types of capital assets: physical, financial, human, social and natural. (46) The multiple outcomes of violence can then also be analyzed in terms of their direct and indirect effects on each of these capital assets. For instance, violence erodes financial capital through increased expenditure on criminal justice services and the health care system, decreased investment and institutional costs. Human capital costs (which clearly also have financial implications) are associated with reductions in life expectancy, as well as victims' reduced educational opportunities and productivity in the workplace. The consequences
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for social capital include insecurity, fear and a deteriorating quality of life, with ramifications in terms of restrictions on community life. In reducing social contact between members of the community, and increasing mistrust, urban violence erodes social capital in a very practical sense. (47) In urban areas, spatial manifestations of violence are particularly important, with the role of spatial design in promoting crime and insecurity now widely recognized. Cities -and their peripheries, where many of the urban poor reside -often contain unsafe spaces that reflect poor infrastructure or design, and where rape, robbery and violent crime exist. Unsafe spaces also include public transport, and isolated or unlit areas such as dark paths and lanes, isolated bus stops or public latrines. The need to commute long distances, and to work early in the morning or late at night -needs largely relating to the urban poor -exacerbate these spatial dangers. (48) While it is important to address the urban design costs of violence, the papers in this issue also address the spatial consequences of the phenomenon of violence itself.
Increasingly, urban space is being reorganized in response to two interrelated issues. First, the exacerbated levels of crime and violence, and second, the lack of confidence in the state's capacity to provide effective police security. Two papers, from very different urban contexts, describe how the rich are retreating to "fortified enclaves", isolating themselves from the poor, who are seen as the perpetrators of violence, with an associated growth in the privatization of security.
In Cape Town, Lemanski argues that along with the end of apartheid and South Africa's armed struggle, and the arrival of majority rule, has come a new form of urban panic focused on criminal activity rather than political insurgency, spreading to previously protected white suburbs. Aggravated by historical mistrust of police officers who previously functioned as brutal government enforcers rather than citizen protectors, fearprovoked residential fortification is common to both the poor and the wealthy. However, while the poor use dogs, window grilles and high fences, the rich rely on sophisticated alarms and armedresponse private security, and increasingly turn to gated communities, fortifying entire neighbourhoods with electrified fences and CCTV to monitor their citadels. The outcome of such "fearmanagement" strategies is sociospatial exclusion and segregation, more polarized than in the 1980s, but now managed by citizens rather than the state. In Managua, Nicaragua, Rodgers describes a similar fortified-enclave model, but with contextually specific differences that relate to the small size of Managua's elite class. Here, urban space has been differentiated, "…not into an archipelago of self-sustaining islands of wealth within a sea of poverty", but through a process of what Rodgers calls "disembedding". While individual residences are fortified, these form part of a "networked community" linked to the shopping malls that service them through a sophisticated transport system of highways and roundabouts. In this sense, parts of the city are "lifted out" from the rest of the metropolis, so that they are increasingly alien from it, and more part of Miami, São Paulo or Los Angeles, spatially and socially apart from the sprawling chaotic, impoverished mass of non-"disembedded" Managua. In both Cape Town and Managua, however, factors other than fear and violence may also be implicitly linked to new spatial forms. In Cape Town, as Lemanski argues, this is a new justification for apartheid-like solutions, while in Managua, Rodgers points to the importance of US lifestyles among the city's elites.
Not only do spatial consequences of violence differ contextually, so too do socially constructed levels of tolerance to violence, and perceptions of what are acceptable and unacceptable levels or types of violent manifestations. Understanding how a society responds, or fails to respond, to different types of violence is a vital component of any policy that aims to reduce violence in an effective manner. Two articles in this volume, focusing on different types of violence, highlight the policy implications of differences in levels of tolerance. Hume's paper on sexual violence in El Salvador discusses the difference between the high profile given to gang problems -in terms of budgetary and media attention -and the largely ignored, although ubiquitous, problem of domestic violence. She argues that the strict distinction between "public" and "private" spaces serves to render invisible much of women's victimization. The demarcation between citizen security and issues of intra-family violence means that gang violence is unacceptable, while intimate-partner violence is tolerated. Yet, gendered violence occurs in both public and private spaces; it is the cultural norms surrounding gendered behaviour that minimize and naturalize what is seen as "private" violence, which is understood in ideological rather than spatial terms. The relationship Editorial between tolerance and levels of violence is explored further by McIlwaine and Moser in their examination of community tolerance of drugs and alcohol consumption and their associated violence, as part of social norms in Guatemala and Colombia. In the urban areas of both countries, there are both similarities and differences. Across the board, there is a greater tolerance of alcohol than of drugs; yet, in Colombia, drug consumption is both more widespread and more socially condoned than in Guatemala. While levels of tolerance are partly an outcome of substance abuse, tolerance can also contribute to substance abuse by normalizing use. However, this is not a linear or clear-cut relationship; high levels of violence can also reduce tolerance, with important implications for community attitudes towards appropriate solutions.
VI. TYPES OF INTERVENTION TO REDUCE VIOLENCE AT NATIONAL, CITY AND COMMUNITY LEVEL FOCUSING ON THE URBAN POOR
INCREASED CONCERN WITH urban violence across the world, but particularly in Latin America and Southern Africa, means that the prevention and reduction of urban crime and violence is now a growth industry, with an extensive number of direct and indirect interventions. Table 2 , which identifies some of the policy approaches and their associated urban-focused interventions, provides the final tool in this background roadmap. This includes sector-specific approaches such as criminal justice that seeks to control and treat economic violence, and the public health (epidemiological) approach, which aims to prevent social and economic violence at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Newer approaches such as conflict transformation and human rights reflect increasing concern with political and institutional violence. Recent recognition of the importance of more integrated, holistic approaches has opened the door to cross-sectoral approaches such as citizen security, CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) and urban renewal. Local-level community-based approaches to rebuilding trust and social capital are still in the process of development.
Such policies are essentially ideal types. In reality, policy makers have shifted from sectorspecific, menu-like, checklist interventions towards more integrated approaches that combine established policies with more innovative ones. These acknowledge not only the multiple forms of violence but also the identity and agency of different social actors. However, to date, there has been a lack of rigorous evaluation of violence-reduction interventions over time -and an associated recognition that this is an exceedingly challenging task. Overall, this results in a tendency towards a "scatter" approach, with the expectation that a diversity of interventions will, together, achieve the desired result.
It is now widely recognized that there are no magic bullets or one-off solutions to the problem of violence reduction. Some approaches work better than others, and are more appropriate in some settings than in others. While each of the papers in this volume increases our understanding of the context-specific nature of solutions, at the same time a number of common critical themes run through many of them. First is the appalling and almost universal distrust and lack of confidence in the state's capacity to control or prevent crime and violence, and the associated structural problems within existing police and judiciary systems. This theme echoes across continents from South Africa to South America, in cities as distinct as Cape Town, Durban, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Managua, small-town Australia, Karachi and Kabul (witness Esser's quote: "The average policeman in Kabul earns US$ 17 per month -you really expect this person to be motivated enough to risk his life?") Second, and closely associated with this, is the rapid expansion of "non-state forms of social governance", (49) which can support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict, but which also generate perverse rather than productive forms of social capital. (50) In the case of Cato Manor, in Natal, Meth vividly describes the highly informal mechanisms of "revenge violence" and vigilante crime adopted by local community women to deal with criminals and robbers. Similarly, in Bangladesh, Garret and Ahmed identify how survey populations used "traditional systems of justice" (such as shalish) rather than formal ones to deal with local problems such as rape. In their analysis of community solutions to substance abuse, McIlwaine and Moser report similar extra-judicial forms of justice. In Colombia, local community members identified social cleansing as a self-help community mechanism to deal with drug addicts, while in Guatemala many spoke in favour of lynching (injuring or killing the accused by dousing them with petrol). Another response that focuses more on the prevention of crime is the privatization of security, with state authorities either contracting or condoning private security firms to conduct public policing, as described in the papers on Cape Town and Managua. However, it is important to note that, in this last example, solutions focus more on the rich than on the poor. At the other end of the continuum of violencedealing with militias and paramilitaries --Gutiér-rez and Jaramillo describe how various attempts at peace pacts between national or municipal governments and non-state armed agencies in Medellín have failed. These have been characterized by "paradoxical pactism", temporary agreements that solve particular problems but that do not address the general balance of power that underlies these problems. The authors argue that "…pactism can create new patterns of power -giving incentives to illegal arms holders", that perpetuate ongoing competition between various actors to provide security and, in so doing, command the allegiance of other communities.
Third is the importance of consulting local communities in designing appropriate solutions. In the case of Guatemala City, for instance, Winton provides a detailed account of young people's perceptions not only of the causes of gang violence but also of the most appropriate solutions. Arguing that youth is not simply a (risky) path to adulthood, but that young people are agents in their own right, she describes their suggested solutions. These are designed to address both individual "traits" of gang members as well as a range of structural problems, and include both informal support, such as family, friends and other community members, and formal institutions, such as security forces, NGOs and religious institutions. In small-town Australia, Eversole and colleagues listed community perceptions of problems that reduced police effectiveness, and concluded that face-to-face communication to build bridges between two very different cultures was a priority. In Mumbai, Roy, Jockin and Javed describe a partnership between the police and an existing network of community organizations. "Slum police panchayats", composed of community-selected representatives, the majority of them women, work closely with the police, and resolve many disputes themselves, preventing them from escalating into violence. In the final research note, Liebermann and Coulson report on another ongoing initiative, currently in development in South Africa, that seeks to strengthen trust in the local police through participatory community-owned and spatially focused violence-prevention strategies. One of the most interesting aspects of "…people-driven crime prevention through place-mapping" is the realization it creates: that crime prevention is not only a policing function but also requires a partnership approach; and that crime is not an unpredictable social phenomenon over which people have no control. However, this also challenges the police to engage with community members in unaccustomed ways, playing into their existing misgivings that they are required to be "…social workers as well as police".
Finally, and very fragmentally, a number of papers tentatively address the issue of fear. In cities across the world, relentless "routinized" daily violence dominates the lives of local populations. The fear of such violence isolates the poor in their homes and the rich in their segregated spaces. This isolation, in turn, perpetuates a fear of the "other" as Lemanski calls it, and contributes to the fragmentation of cities, socially, economically and politically. To date, few violence-related strategies have confronted or addressed the issue of fear or its associated relationship to power and powerlessness. Ultimately, however, this may provide a critically important mechanism for redressing the impact of violence on the daily lives of the poor and excluded in cities throughout the world, so graphically described in the papers in this volume.
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